Technical Report

Formal Specification and Verification of the Intrusion-Tolerant Enclaves Protocol

Mohamed Layouni, , Jozef Hooman and Sofične Tahar.

ABSTRACT

In this paper, we present a correctness proof of the Intrusion-tolerant Enclaves protocol. Enclaves is a group-membership protocol. It assumes a Byzantine failure model, and has a maximum resiliency of one third. To carry out the proof, we adaptively combine a number of techniques, namely model checking, theorem proving and analytical mathematics.  We use the Murphi model checker to verify authentication, then the PVS theorem prover a Byzantine failure model, and has a maximum resiliency of one third. To carry out the proof, we adaptively combine a number of techniques, namely model checking, theorem proving and analytical mathematics.  We use the Murphi model checker to verify authentication, then the PVS theorem prover to formally specify and prove proper Byzantine Agreement, Agreement Termination and Integrity, and finally we mathematically prove the robustness and unpredictability of the group key management module using the random oracle model.
 


 
Download PDF file (PDF File
Download Postscript file (PS File
Send comments and suggestions to: layouni@ece.concordia.ca